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NOTES & COMMENTS
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES
AWARDS ACT OF 1976
INTRODUCTION

Under the traditional American rule, each party litigant is required to absorb the cost of his owh attorney's fees.' Although the
judicially created "bad faith"' and "common benefit ' 3 doctrines are
exceptions to this rule,4 the narrowness of their application often
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). The general
American rule which precludes fee recovery by successful litigants differs from the approach
of many other nations, including Great Britain, where fees are automatically awarded to the
prevailing parties in all lawsuits. Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 639 (1974); see Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 n.4.
General distrust of lawyers has been identified as one possible source of the American rule.
Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys'Feesand EqualAccess to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rv.
636, 641 (1974). Other factors attributed to the American break with English tradition are
the belief that automatic fee shifting would forestall meritorious litigation by persons of less
than substantial means, see Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49
IowA L. REV. 75, 81 (1963), notions of individualism peculiar to the United States, Note,
Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216, 1220-21
(1967), the failure of early statutory fee schedules to be adjusted in accordance with cost of
living expenses, Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALIF. L. Rav. 792, 798-99 (1966), and more recently, "blind adherence to a questionable
precedent," Sands, Attorneys' Fees as Recoverable Costs, 63 A.B.A.J. 510, 513 (1977).
The American no-fee rule has been the subject of much debate in recent years. Its
proponents argue that a mandatory fee shifting policy would operate to discourage impecunious litigants. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974);
Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. REv. 26,
36 (1969). Critics of the rule, however, generally argue that a litigant is never fully compensated when legal fees are subtracted from a damage recovery. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel,
The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. Rav. 75 (1963); McCormick,
Counsel Fees and OtherExpenses of Litigationas an Element of Damages, 15 MwN. L. Rv.
619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees:A New Method of FinancingLegal
Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 761 (1972); Stoebuck, Counsel FeesIncluded in Costs: A Logical
Development, 38 U. COLO. L. Rav. 202 (1966). Moreover, it has been noted that the American
rule may be particularly unjust where a civil rights litigant prevails in a nonpecuniary action.
See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam); Lee v.
Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees
in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 381 (1971).
2 See notes 11-28 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 29-37 and accompanying text infra.
The "bad faith" and "common benefit" exceptions to the American rule are derived
from the historical authority of the chancellor to do equity. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5
(1973); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939).
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gives rise to harsh results. In the past, the limitations of these exceptions were most vivid in instances where parties were seeking to
enforce, at their own expense, constitutionally guaranteed rights
and privileges. 5 In an effort to promote public interest litigation by
private parties,6 the lower federal courts developed the "private
attorney general" doctrine under which fees were awarded to litigants who had vindicated important statutory rights of all citizens.'
There also exist numerous federal statutory exceptions to the American rule prohibiting
fee shifting. Five basic categories may be used to classify these legislative schemes: (1)
authorization of a mandatory award of reasonable fees to the prevailing plaintiff, e.g., Packers
and Stockyards Act § 309(f), 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1976); Perishable Argricultural Commodities
Act § 7(b), 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1976); Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); Truth-inLending Act § 130(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976); Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b),
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976); Communications Act § 206, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1976); Interstate
Commerce Act § 16, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1976); (2) authorization of a mandatory award of
reasonable fees to the prevailing party, e.g., Jewelers Hall-Mark Act § 294, 15 U.S.C. §§
298(b)-298(d) (1976); Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. § 784(g) (1976);
(3) authorization of a discretionary award of reasonable fees to the prevailing plaintiff, e.g.,
Freedom of Information Act § 1(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 2310,15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1976); Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (1976); (4) authorization of a discretionary award of
reasonable fees to the prevailing party, e.g., Copyright Act § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976);
Education Amendments Act of 1972, tit. VII, § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, tit. II, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, §
706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); and (5) authorization of a discretionary award of
reasonable fees to either party, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77K(e) (1976);
Trust Indenture Act § 323(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77WWW(a) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 9(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976); Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. §
4911(d) (1976). For a list of 90 statutory fee award provisions, see SUBCOMMrrrEE ON CONSTrUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMTI'rEE, CIVIL RIGHTS ATroRNEY's FEES AwARDs

ACT OF 1976-SOURcE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DocuMENTs (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK].
1 Since private enforcement was often the sole means of redressing unconstitutional
practices, many improper activities went unchecked due to the reluctance of aggrieved parties

to commence protracted and costly litigation. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5910 [hereinafter cited as S.

REP.]. The Senate Report states that "all of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon
private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are
to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which
these laws contain." Id. See also H. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted
in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, at 209-19 [hereinafter cited as H. REP.].
I Public interest litigation is often identified by three basic features. It is customarily
seen as involving legal issues which, at the time of litigation, are of extreme importance.
Consequently, the action's final disposition will ordinarily affect many individuals not a party
to the lawsuit. Finally, public interest suits are customarily initiated by private plaintiffs
rather than by governmental authorities. See Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in PublicInterest
Litigation,48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301 (1973).
1 See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); NAACP v.
Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); La Raza Unida
v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affl'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 968 (1974); notes 38-53 and accompanying text infra. For an analysis of the development
of the private attorfiey general doctrine, as well as a discussion of the cases utilizing this
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This attempt to create a third equitable exception to the American
rule proved short lived, however, when the Supreme Court called for
8
legislative rather than judicial justification for its use.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 19761 was enacted to fill the void created by the repudiation of the private attorney general doctrine. Although the legislative history of the Act
reveals that "no startling new remedy" was intended,10 recent judicial interpretations of the Act have raised several questions regarding the proper use of this new fee-shifting power. In suggesting
guidelines for an application of the Act that are in harmony with
the intent and purpose of its framers, this Note will examine and
compare the policies underlying fee shifting pursuant to the traditional equitable doctrines, the considerations espoused by Congress
in passing the Act and recent decisions which have both granted and
denied attorney's fees under the Act.
NON-STATUTORY FEE SHIFTING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

The Bad Faith Doctrine
The bad faith exception to the traditional American rule theoretically functions as a deterrent to the commencement of unfounded and administratively crippling lawsuits." To this end, a
party who is the object of an unfounded action or defense which is
unreasonably brought or maintained may have the financial burden
equitable exception, see Note, AwardingAttorneys' Fees to the "PrivateAttorney General":
JudicialGreen Light to PrivateLitigation in the Public Interest, 24 HAsTrNGs L.J. 733 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Green Light].
I See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); notes 50-53
and accompanying text infra.
I Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.§ 1988); see notes 54-56
and accompanying text infra. The Act, the Senate and House Reports, relevant Congressional
Record excerpts, and various appendices are reprinted in SouRca BOOK, supra note 4.
The Senate Judiciary Committee declared that its purpose in drafting the Act was to
"remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Alyeska. . . ,and to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws."
S. REP., supra note 5, at 1. The report emphasized that the presence of fee award sections in
some civil rights statutes, and the lack thereof in others, could no longer be justified. Id. at
4. Compare, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976) (fee award allowed in
housing discrimination suit), with 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) (prior to Act, fee awards not
authorized in housing and property discrimination suit).
,0S. REP., supra note 5, at 6. The Senate Judiciary Committee intended that fees should
be awarded under the Act in a manner consistent with the practice of federal courts prior to
the decision in Alyeska. Id.; see notes 38-53 and accompanying text infra.
" Note, The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 34 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv.
205, 209 (1977). The traditional rationale underlying the implementation of the bad faith fee
award is often identified as one of punishment. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Nussbaum,
supranote 6, at 317.
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of his fees transferred to his opponent through a court's use of its
equitable powers. 2 This fee shifting most commonly occurs where a
litigant has purposefully utilized dilatory tactics at trial.'3 For example, in Bond v. Stanton,'4 the plaintiffs brought a class action
suit against Indiana state officials seeking to compel compliance
with Title XIX of the Social Security Act.' 5 In granting injunctive
relief, the trial court noted that the state disregarded its clear legal
duty for 2 years and, throughout the unnecessarily protracted
litigation, "'uncontinually asserted compliance with [the statutory] requirements in the face of documentation to the contrary.' ""
The trial court's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff was affound that the stringent bad
firmed by the seventh circuit which
7
satisfied.'
been
had
standard
faith
Traditionally, a shifting of fees would also arise where a defendant's oppressive conduct, or "obdurate obstinacy," necessitated
the commencement of a lawsuit.'" Such an application of the bad
faith doctrine, and its subsequent liberalization, is well illustrated
22 See, e.g., F.D. Rich v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77 [2], at 1709 (2d
ed. 1976).
" See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTcE
54.77, at 1709 n.17 (2d ed. 1976 & Supp. 1977-1978).
, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.), vacated on othergrounds, 429 U.S. 973 (1976).
,' 528 F.2d at 690; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1976). Title XIX of the Social Security
Act prescribes timetables for the states' adoption of an early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment program for all children eligible for Medicaid benefits. Social Security
Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 302(a), 81 Stat. 929 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396d
(1965)). Upon finding that Indiana state officials had failed to meet these deadlines, the
district court ordered compliance. 372 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ind.), affl'd, 504 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir.
1974).
,1 528 F.2d at 690. Support for the court's shifting of fees based upon the defendant's
use of dilatory trial tactics may be found in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), where the Supreme
Court declared that a fee award could be premised on the bad faith of a party "in the conduct
of the litigation." Id. at 15.
11528 F.2d at 690. The Supreme Court remanded the issue of attorney's fees for reconsideration under the Act. 429 U.S. 973 (1976). Subsequently, the plaintiffs were granted a fee
award. Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977). In Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th
Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 881 (1977), the abortion policies of a municipal
hospital were challenged as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 515 F.2d at 544. Throughout the litigation, the city asserted that the plaintiff had lost
her standing to sue since she was no longer pregnant. Id. at 547-48. In light of the Supreme
Court's rejection of this argument, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the city's defense
was deemed totally frivolous, thus justifying a fee award pursuant to the bad faith doctrine.
515 F.2d at 547-48; see Note, 8 CoNN. L. Rnv. 551 (1976).
IAWith respect to fee awards based on a defendant's pre-trial conduct, the fourth circuit,
in Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir.), vacated, 382 U.S. 103 (1965), noted
that "attorneys' fees are appropriate only when it is found that the bringing of the action
should have been unnecessary and was compelled by... unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy."
345 F.2d at 321.
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by a line of desegregation decisions. In Bell v. School Board,'9 the
plaintiff obtained injunctive relief enjoining defendant's practice of
racial discrimination in its school district."0 A fourth circuit panel
affirmed a fee award to the plaintiff pointing to the school board's
"long continued pattern of evasion and obstruction which . . .
[cast] a heavy burden on the children and their parents."" In
addition, the court noted that the defendant had interposed "a
variety of administrative obstacles to thwart the valid wishes of the
' 22
plaintiff for a desegregated education.
This notion of justifying fee awards on the basis of a defendant's
reproachable pre-trial conduct was more broadly pronounced by the
eighth circuit in Clark v. Board of Education.2 Expressing deep
concern over the necessity of costly private vindication of clearly
defined rights, the court stated that "[i]f well known constitutional
guarantees continue to be ignored or abridged. . . ,the time is fast
approaching when the additional sanction of substantial attorney
fees should be seriously considered. 21 4 With this language, Clark
implicitly endorsed a view of the bad faith doctrine which recognized a need for a greater flexibility in the exercise of the court's
equitable fee-shifting powers. 25 This type of liberal approach was
evident in Cato v. Parham, 6 wherein the plaintiffs request for attorney's fees was granted although the court did not appear to be
thoroughly convinced that the school board had functioned or litigated in bad faith.2 1 In this respect, the Cato decision was indicative
of a trend whereby some federal courts utilized the bad faith doctrine to neutralize the sometimes inequitable financial results of
private enforcement of constitutionally guaranteed rights.2 8 Despite
this expansion of the bad faith rationale, however, potential public
interest litigants still could not be certain that a court would shift
19321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
21

Id. at 497.

21 Id.

at 500. The court noted that the school district's policy of school segregation
remained unchanged despite the Supreme Court's holding in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954). 321 F.2d at 495.
22 321 F.2d at 500. Illustrative of the defendant's purposeful denial of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights was the pretextuous fabrication of rules which, in practice, were inapplicable to white students. Id. at 497. For example, the school board required black children to apply for a change of schools without properly publicizing the application deadline.
Id. at 498. Moreover, the board interposed "captious objections," contending that the applications were sent to the improper office. Id.
" 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966).
24 Id. at 671.
21See Green Light, supra note 7, at 737-38.
" 293 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Ark.), affl'd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1968).
27 293 F. Supp. at 1378.
21 See Green Light, supra note 7, at 738.
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fees in all instances where a defendant's conduct had necessitated
private enforcement of public rights.
The Common Benefit Doctrine
The common benefit doctrine also permits courts to shift the
expense of counsel fees. This theory originally was designed to prevent unjust enrichment when a successful plaintiff, through maintenance of a lawsuit at his own expense, had recovered damages or
preserved a monetary fund in which an ascertainable class of persons shared a common interest.? Under this view, litigants who had
vindicated far-reaching legal rights of the public at large by obtaining injunctive relief were foreclosed from receiving fee awards. 3 ° The
Supreme Court, however, expanded equitable fee-shifting powers
under this rule in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,

31

when it held that

the absence of relief pecuniary in nature should not prove fatal to
the recovery of attorney's fees under the common benefit doctrine. 2
Mills was a shareholder derivative action in which the plaintiff,
seeking to dissolve a corporate merger, alleged that the vote in its
favor was precipitated by the defendant corporation's use of materially misleading proxy statements.3 Although the Court granted the
requested relief, the nonpecuniary nature of the action seemingly
precluded a shifting of attorney's fees. 34 Identifying serious new polPrior to Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), see notes 31-34 and
accompanying text infra, the traditional rule was that fee shifting under the common benefit
doctrine could occur only in those actions which resulted in the recovery of damages or
monetary funds capable of financing the fee award. See 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.77[2], at 1705-07 (2d ed. 1976). Additionally, the action must have benefited a class of
persons who are similarly situated to the party litigating the claim. Id. These prerequisites
stemmed from the landmark case of Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882), where the
plaintiff, a railway company bondholder, secured and saved a large portion of a trust fund
which was being wasted by defendants. Id. at 529. The suit resulted in payments to bondholders of previously unrealized dividends from which the plaintiff was able to draw a fee award.
Id. at 531. See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-6 n.7 (1973); Green Light, supra note 7, at
736.
so See note 29 supra.
31396 U.S. 375 (1970).
"Id. at 392.
3 Id. at 377-78. The action was founded on allegations that inclusion of the misleading
information in the proxy statements was violative of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). 396 U.S. at 378.
m See 396 U.S. at 392. In discussing the early decisions which had employed the common
benefit doctrine, the Court noted that "nothing in these cases indicates that the suit must
actually bring money into the court as a prerequisite to the court's power to order reimbursement of expenses." Id. (footnote omitted). Initially, it was necessary for the Court to distinguish its holding in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
See 396 U.S. at 391. Fleischmann involved a trademark infringement action brought under
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976). 386 U.S. at 714-15 & n.1. Although this
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icy considerations, however, the Court awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees and stated that "in vindicating the statutorypolicy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the corporation and
its shareholders. '35 The implementation of fee shifting as a means
of assisting and encouraging legal action by litigants whose suits
result in significant benefits to a class was further justified by the
Court when it noted that "regardless of the relief granted, private
stockholders' actions of this sort 'involve corporate therapeutics,'
and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important
means of enforcement of the proxy statute.

'3

Despite the broaden-

ing of the common benefit doctrine by the Mills Court, public interest litigants faced a formidable barrier to recovery in that it was still
necessary to meet the requirements that a court be able to exact fees
from an ascertainable class of persons, within its jurisdiction, whose
37
situations had been improved by the underlying litigation.
The Rise and Fall of the Private Attorney General Doctrine
Given the limitations of the bad faith and common benefit
doctrines, as well as the inconsistant manner in which the courts
exercised their equitable powers, 3 these exceptions proved to be
inadequate incentives for the public interest litigant. Responding to
the perceived recalcitrance of potential public interest litigants to
bring civil rights suits, the lower federal courts developed the
"private attorney general" doctrine.3 If litigants "benefitted their
statutory scheme detailed the compensatory and injunctive remedies which were available
to a litigant who had prevailed under its provisions, no mention was made of attorney's fees.
See id. at 720-21. From this structure the Court gleaned a congressional intent to place fee
awards outside the purview of the judiciary while exercising remedial powers pursuant to the
Act. Id. The Mills Court, however, distinguished the shareholder derivative suit before it on
the grounds that the express remedies of the Securities and Exchange Act were relatively
minimal. Id.
-"396 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added).
16Id. (quoting Murphy v. North Am. Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y.
1940)).
31 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 396-97; 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
54.77[2], at 1707-08 (2d ed. 1976).
Is With respect to the frequency of awards under the bad faith doctrine, one commentator has stated that "only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice can the
exercise of the power by the district court be justified." 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

54.77[2], at 1709-11 (2d ed. 1976); see, e.g., Rude v. Buchhalter, 286 U.S. 451 (1932); Rolax
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); RFC v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 42
F. Supp. 244 (W.D.N.Y. 1941). For a discussion of the subjectivity and arbitrariness which
permeate court awards of fees under the bad faith doctrine, see Falcon, Award of Attorneys'
Fees in Civil Rights and ConstitutionalLitigation, 33 MD. L. Rxv. 379 (1973).
3' See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 n.46 (1975);
Watt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703
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class," and "effectuated a strong congressional policy,"m° they were
deemed to be private attorneys general and thus entitled to a fee
award. This new fee shifting rationale received strong support when
the Mills decision was read against the language of the Supreme
Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,Inc. 41 The plaintiff in

Newman sought injunctive relief under Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 which prohibits racial discrimination in private accommodations. 2 While fee awards are specifically authorized under
the statute, the grant of such an award is entirely within the discretion of the court.4 3 Although the fourth circuit had interpreted this
fee shifting provision to be only a minimal supplement to the equitable powers generally exercised by the courts, 4 the Supreme Court
viewed the statute as an attempt to assist and promote private
litigation under statutes evincing high congressional priorities:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident
that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would
have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing
broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in
form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he
cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not
for himself alone but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If
successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance
the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal
courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel
fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance
arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.
It follows that one who succeeds in obtaining an injunction
under that Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust.45
(M.D. Ala. 1972); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 968 (1974). See generally Derfner, One Giant
Step: The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. Louis L.J. 441, 441-45
(1977); Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 331-37; Comment, Liability for Attorneys' Fees in the
Federal Courts-The Private Attorney GeneralException, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 201
(1975); Green Light, supra note 7.
" Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala. 1972);
" 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976).
0 The fee award provision of Title II is virtually identical to that of the Act. Compare
id. with Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
" Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967).
"390 U.S. at 401-02 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Notwithstanding the existence of specific statutory authorization for the granting of fee awards under Title II, many lower federal
courts viewed Newman as introducing a pervasive new fee shifting
exception." The ensuant application of this doctrine was foreshadowed in Sims v. Amos,4 7 where the plaintiffs successfully achieved
reapportionment of the state legislature. In affirmatively resolving
the question whether the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of
attorney's fees absent any statutory authority, the court stated:
If, pursuant to this action, plaintiffs have benefitted their class
and effectuated a strong congressional policy, they are entitled to
attorneys' fees regardless of defendants' good or bad faith ...
Indeed, under such circumstances, the award loses much of its
discretionary character and becomes a part of the effective remedy
a court should fashion to encourage public-minded suits, and to
carry out congressional policy. 8
Subsequent to Sims, a, vast growth in the use of the private
attorney general doctrine occurred in the lower federal courts. 9 This
development was quashed in Aleyska Pipeline Service Inc. v. Wilderness Society,51 however, where use of the private attorney general
doctrine as an equitable means of fee shifting was emphatically
rejected by the Supreme Court." Despite reaffirmation of the common benefit and bad faith doctrines,- the Court concluded that only
Congress could determine which federal rights were of such overriding importance that fee awards for successful plaintiffs were mer3
ited.5
See Green Light, supra note 7, at 742-48; note 39 supra.
340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
Id. at 694 (citations omitted). Although the Sims court found that circumstances
would have justified a fee award under the bad faith doctrine, it chose to predicate the award
on the private attorney general doctrine. Id. at 695. As such, this holding appears to represent
the first clear instance where judicial preference for the private attorney general fee shifting
theory was indicated.
11See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, (1st Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975);
Incarcerated Men v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th
Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir.
1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493
F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973). See generally 6
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ' 54.77, at 40-45 (2d ed. Supp. 1977-1978); Derfner, supra note
39, at 443 & nn.9-22; Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 321-31.
o 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
"

'7

" Id. at 262.
52 Id. at 257-59. The Court stated that the bad faith and common benefit doctrines "are
unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular
situations, unless forbidden by Congress." Id. at 259.
" 421 U.S. at 269-71. Alyeska involved a suit brought by three environmental interest
groups seeking to enjoin the issuance of construction permits for the Alaska pipeline. The
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1976 ACT:

CONGRESSIONAL STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION

Enacted by Congress as "an appropriate response" to the
Alyeska decision, 54 the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
197611 provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977,
1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title IX of
Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on
behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a
violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue
Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
While any doubts as to the Act's constitutionality have been
dispelled,57 there is an ever-increasing divergence of opinion among
District Court for the District of Columbia first granted a preliminary injunction. Wilderness
Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). The injunction was, however, subsequently
dissolved and the complaint was dismissed by the district court in an unreported decision.
See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 851 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917
(1973). This decision was reversed by the court of appeals which held that the pipeline
construction would violate the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). 479 F.2d
at 842. In granting the plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees pursuant to the private attorney
general doctrine, the court declared that the plaintiffs had vindicated "important statutory
rights of all citizens." Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In reversing, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the private attorney general theory of fee shifting. 421
U.S. at 260-63. With respect to the Court's repudiation of the private attorney general doctrine and its reaffirmation of the common benefit and bad faith rationales, Justice Marshall,
in a dissenting opinion, concluded "that the Court is willing to tolerate the 'equitable' exceptions to its analysis, not because they can be squared with it, but because they are by now
too well established to be casually dispensed with." 421 U.S. at 278 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The negative reaction to Alyeska is reflected in one commentator's opinion that it is "an
extremely confused and intellectually dishonest opinion." Derfner, supranote 39, at 446 n.31;
accord, Special Project, Recent Developments in Attorney's Fees, 29 VAn. L. REV. 685, 72933 (1976).
" S. REP., supra note 5, at 4; see H. REP., supra note 5, at 2-3.
Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §
1988).
" Sections 1977 to 1981 of the Revised Statutes include the following provisions: 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (equal rights of citizens under the law); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) (property
rights of citizens); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (civil action for deprivation of rights); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (1976) (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights or preventing officer from performing
duty); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976) (action for neglecting to prevent conspiracy to interfere with
civil rights).
Title IX of Public Law 92-318 is codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) and prohibits
discrimination in federally assisted educational programs on the grounds of sex or blindness.
Title VI is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976) and has similar prohibitions
with respect to federally assisted programs on grounds of race, color, or national origin.
" Subsequent to its passage, the constitutionality of the Act was challenged on the
ground that it abrogated the sovereign immunity held by the states. See, e.g., Seals v.
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Quarterly County Ct., 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977); Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172 (7th Cir.
1977); White v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Recently, however, in Hutto v.
Finney, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2575 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional propriety
of a court order which, in effect, required that fees be paid under the Act from public funds.
This was clearly the result intended by Congress when it stated "that the attorneys' fees, like
other items of costs, will be collected either directly from the official, in his official capacity,
from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or local government (whether
or not the agency or government is a named party)." S. REP., supra note 5, at 5 (footnotes
omitted); see H. REP., supra note 5, at 7. As the Hutto Court observed, Congress "rejected
at least two attempts to amend the Act and immunize state and local governments from
awards." 98 S. Ct. at 2576 (footnote omitted).
Despite the eleventh amendment's grant to the states of sovereign immunity, a doctrine
which generally forbids the courts from assessing monetary penalties against state treasuries,
see, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the
Court stated that
Congress has plenary power to set aside the States' immunity from retroactive relief
in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. When it passed the Act, Congress
undoubtedly intended to exercise that power and to authorize fee awards payable
by the States when their officials are sued in their official capacities. The Act itself
could not be broader. It applies to "any" action brought to enforce certain civil
rights laws.
98 S. Ct. at 2575 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)). Fitzpatrick was a class
action suit alleging that Connecticut's statutory retirement benefit plans were sexually discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-5 (1976). Although the district court held that the state's statutory scheme was violative of Title VII, it refused to award either backpay or attorney's fees reasoning that such a
recovery would be violative of the eleventh amendment and the principle of sovereign immunity. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278, 285-88 (D. Conn. 1974). Although the second
circuit affirmed the denial of backpay, it reversed with respect to attorney's fees. The court
noted that such an award would have only an ancillary effect on the state treasury and thus
was permissible under Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 519 F.2d 559, 571 (2d Cir.
1975). The Supreme Court reversed that part of the decision which denied the backpay, and
stated further that the fee award would be justified despite its having more than an ancillary
effect on the state treasury. 427 U.S. at 457. Noting that Title VII had recently been amended
to bring state and local government employees within its terms, id. at 448 n.1, the Court
concluded that through Congress' power under the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment, the fee award provision of Title VII would withstand all tests of sovereign immunity:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority
that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that
authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections
by their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress
may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against
States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
Id. at 456.
The Hutto defendants did not question the rule enunciated in Fitzpatrick. Rather, it was
argued that "Congress must enact express statutory language making the States liable if it
wishes to abrogate their immunity." 98 S.Ct. at 2576 (footnote omitted). The Court rejected
this position by noting that unlike laws which would give rise to "retroactive liability for
prelitigation conduct," thereby requiring "an extraordinarily explicit statutory mandate,"
the Act imposes attorney's fees as part of costs. Id. As such, the fee award "does not compensate the plaintiff for the injury that first brought him into court. Instead, the award reimburses him for a portion of the expenses he incurred in seeking prospective relief." Id. at 2576
n.24. The Court was thus able to rely on the legislative history of the Act as evidence of a
congressional intent to assess fees as costs against the states. Id. at 2577. The judicial power
to make such an assessment derives in part from the "'inherent authority of the Court in
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the federal courts concerning its proper application. Problems have
arisen, for example, in determining whether a party has in fact
"prevailed" within the meaning of the Act, whether fees may be
shifted in actions where a party prevails on non-statutory grounds
which have been joined with a statutory claim covered by the Act,
whether a damage recovery obviates the need for awarding counsel
fees, whether defendants may recover under circumstances less
egregious than bad faith, and whether a plaintiff in a simple tax
refund suit may seek the benefit of the Act. Finally, assuming an
award is proper, the court must determine what constitutes a reasonable amount. The remaining portion of this Note will consider
these issues.
Notion of the "PrevailingParty"
Faced with a request for fees under the Act, a court first must
determine if a party has "prevailed" within the meaning of the
statute. The framers of the Act made clear that a final decree by
a court should not be a prerequisite to a finding of entitlement. As
stated in the Senate Report, "parties may be considered to have
prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment
or without formally obtaining relief."58 Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Association5 (NCAA), illustrates a determination of
"prevailing party" consistent with this legislative intent. In Buckton, the plaintiffs sought to maintain their eligibility to play intercollegiate hockey." The NCAA, the Eastern Collegiate Athletic
Association and Boston University had declared the plaintiffs ineligible because of their participation in a Canadian Junior hockey
the orderly administration of justice as between all parties litigant.'" Id. (quoting Fairmont
Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 74 (1927)). In fact, it has been argued that pursuant
to their traditional equitable powers, courts should be permitted to assess attorney's fees
against the states in the absence of any statutory authority. Note, Attorneys' Fees and the
Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1875 (1975).
IsS. REP., supra note 5, at 5. The propriety of fee awards pendente lite was also recognized by both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. See id.; H. REP., supra note 5,
at 8. Both reports made specific reference to Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974), where
the Supreme Court noted that to "delay a fee award until the entire litigation is concluded
would work substantial hardship on plaintiffs and their counsel, and discourage the institution of actions." Id. at 723. These awards are especially necessary in civil rights actions which
are often characterized by protracted litigation. With respect to the proper instance for an
award pendente lite, the Bradley Court reasoned that "the entiy of any order that determines
substantial rights of the parties may be an appropriate occasion upon which to consider the
propriety of an award of counsel fees." Id. at 722 n.28. The Bradley approach has been
uniformly adopted by courts awarding fees under the Act. See, e.g., Betts v. Coltes, 449 F.
Supp. 751 (D. Haw. 1978); Howard v. Phelps, 443 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. La. 1978).
,' 436 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Mass. 1977).
Id. at 1259.
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program.' Alleging that this disqualification was violative of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction in district
court.62 Subsequent trials gave rise to a conseit decree joined in by
all parties except the NCAA. 3 Although the NCAA did agree to
reevaluate and restructure its posture with respect to eligibility requirements, 4 it nonetheless moved to vacate the preliminary injunction. When this motion was denied, 5 the plaintiffs were permitted to complete their third year of intercollegiate hockey. 6 In granting the plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees, the Buckton court
rejected the NCAA's argument that the plaintiffs had not prevailed
within the meaning of the Act. 7 It was noted that the NCAA's
failure to appeal the issuance of the preliminary injunction contributed to the plaintiffs' success in completing the entire college
hockey program. Since eligibility standards of the NCAA were
refashioned as a direct result of the injunction and consent decree,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs had prevailed "in a very
practical and meaningful sense."69
1 Id.
12 See

Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1157-60 (D.
Mass. 1973).
6 436 F. Supp. at 1260. Defendant Eastern Collegiate Athletic Association reinstated the
plaintiffs while urging the NCAA to do the same. Similarly, Boston University requested the
NCAA to reconsider its position. Id.
" Id. In an affidavit, the Assistant Director of the NCAA stated that, as a result of the
underlying litigation, the NCAA had reevaluated and revised its constitution "in order to
eliminate any discrimination either in favor of or against Canadian hockey players or in favor
of or against American student-athletes or aliens." Id. (quoting June 11, 1976, affidavit of
Warren Brown, at 4).
436 F. Supp. at 1260.

Id. at 1265.
6Id.

Id. In addition to its failure to appeal the preliminary injunction, the NCAA began to
effectuate reinstatement of plaintiff Buckton after the litigation was substantially completed.
Id. at n.14.
11Id. The court premised much of its analysis on Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059,
1063 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a case
in which the plaintiff brought a Title VII race and sex discrimination suit against the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Some months after commencement of the
action, HEW unexpectedly reversed its position. 411 F. Supp. at 1061. The district court
approved the proffered settlement and awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff as the
"prevailing party" pursuant to the Title VII fee award provision found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(k) (1976). 411 F. Supp. at 1065. The Parkerholding is relevant to a determination whether
a party has prevailed under the Act since Congress "intended that the standards for awarding
fees [under the Act] be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act." S. REP., supra note 5, at 4. Moreover, Parkerwas specifically cited in the House Report
as a case exemplifying the broad reading to be ascribed to the term "prevailing party." H.
REP., supra note 5, at 7.
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Buckton appears to be consistent with the liberal application
of the Act that Congress envisioned when it suggested guidelines for
ascertaining whether a party had in fact prevailed. The spirit of the
Act dictates that "the operative factor is success, not at which stage
or how that success is achieved."7 0 Viewed in this fashion, the eventual resolution of the dispute in Buckton did not differ in practical
effect from a settlement. This is certainly tantamount to a victory
within the meaning of the Act. 71 As one court has noted, a denial of
fees in cases similar to Buckton would often compel litigants to
proceed to final judgment in an effort to receive formally docketed
relief.7 2 This clearly would be "an extravagant waste of judicial resources. . . . Moreover, a denial of fees . . . would detrimentally
affect the ability of future litigants . . . to secure the services of
qualified counsel." 3
7oParker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1063 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub noma. Parker v.
Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see note 69 supra.
11As recognized in the Senate Report, "parties may be considered to have prevailed when
they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief." S.
REP., supra note 5, at 5 (emphasis added). Similarly, the House Report, in discussing the
term "prevailing party," stated that it was "not intended to be limited to the victor only after
entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits." H. REP., supra note 5, at 7.
Thus, the Act may be applied to shift fees where litigation has terminated by consent decree.
Id.; see, e.g., Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1975); Incarcerated Men v.
Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th
Cir. 1970); Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1970). Moreover, fee
awards would be proper where a litigant has obtained an out-of-court settlement, "thus
helping to lessen docket congestion." H. REP., supra note 5, at 7; accord, Hartmann v.
Gaffney, 446 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1977); cf. Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C.
1976), aff'd sub nom. Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (fees awarded to
plaintiffs after settlement of Title VII claim). Finally, where a defendant voluntarily ceases
the unlawful practice which gave rise to the litigation, thus obviating the need for formal
relief, a fee award would still be permissible under the Act. H. REP., supra note 5, at 7; see
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Andersen, 569 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1978);
NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978); cf. Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach.
Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) (Title VII fee award).
As decisions under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were intended to operate as guidelines in
applying the 1976 Act, S. REP., supra note 5, at 5, the seventh circuit's decision in Williams
v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974), illustrates the boundaries of the term
"prevailing party." Plaintiff Williams, seeking a Title VII fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(k) (1976), asserted that a litigant is entitled to fees if an action has precipitated policy
changes in a corporation's employment department, notwithstanding a judgment on the
merits in favor of the defendant. Rejecting this argument, the Williams court stated that the
scope of the term prevailing party could not be extended beyond a "courtroom context." 492
F.2d at 408.
n Hartmann v. Gaffney, 446 F. Supp. 809, 812 (D. Minn. 1977). In Hartmann, the
settlement agreement in a § 1988 suit required, inter alia, that the plaintiff dismiss his action
against the defendant who in turn was to maintain the plaintiffs hospital privileges. Based
on this eventual resolution of the action, the court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff as
a "prevailing party" under the Act, despite the fact that he received less relief through
settlement than was originally requested. 446 F. Supp. at 812.
" Id.
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Joint Fee and Non-Fee Claims
Consistent with the remedial purpose of the Act, its legislative
history states that a party may recover attorney's fees even though
the grounds on which the action was finally adjudicated were not
covered by the Act. 74 Illustrative in this regard is Southeast Legal
Defense Group v. Adams,

75

where the plaintiffs, in challenging the

location of a proposed freeway, alleged racial discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of the Federal Highway Act.76 In
holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment under the Federal Highway Act, 7" the court dismissed the civil rights claim as
moot. 78 The Adams court rejected the defendants' contention that

the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees since they had not
prevailed under a statute enumerated in the Act. 79 The court quoted
the House Report which notes that sometimes "the claim with fees
may involve a constitutional question which the courts are reluctant
to resolve if the non-constitutional (sic) claim is dispositive." s In
recognition of this, the House Report states that fees may still be
awarded if the claim for which the statute authorizes fees meets the
"substantiality" test"1 and "the plaintiff prevails on the non-fee
, H. REP., supra note 5, at 4 n.7.
, 436 F. Supp. 891 (D. Ore. 1977).
See 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1976).
436 F. Supp. at 892.
Id. at 894.
' Id. The statute utilized by the court in granting relief, the Federal Aid Highway Act,
23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1976), contains no fee shifting provision.
0 H. REP., supra note 5, at 4 n.7. The report also notes that when neither the fee nor the
non-fee claims have constitutional dimensions and the plaintiff prevails on the latter ground,
he "is entitled to a determination on the [fee] claim for the purpose of awarding counsel
fees." Id.
11Id. The substantiality test derives from the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction which
allows federal courts concurrently to entertain state and federal claims. For example, in
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), the plaintiffs, attacking a New York State regulation
under § 1983, also claimed that it conflicted with various federal regulations. The district
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs based on the supremacy clause. The second circuit
reversed this decision, holding that because the plaintiffs had failed to present a substantial
constitutional claim, subject matter jurisdiction was lacking in the lower court. 471 F.2d 347
(2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion that a "substantial" question is necessary to support jurisdiction. 415 U.S. at 537. Rather, the Court set forth the test
as follows:
[Flederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their
jurisdiction if they are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid
of merit," . . . "wholly insubstantial," . . . "obviously frivolous," . . . "plainly
unsubstantial," . . . or "no longer open to discussion ... .
Id. at 536-37 (quoting Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); Levering & Garrigues Co.
v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933); Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288
(1910); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80 (1909); Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport,
193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)). Consequently, since the complaint alleged state actions which were
'
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claim arising out of a 'common nucleus of operative fact.' "82 Since
the constitutional issue in Adams was not "'plainly insubstantial,' or 'obviously without merit' 83 and the two claims were "so
interrelated that plaintiffs 'would ordinarily be expected to try
them all in one judicial proceeding,'"" the court found that the
requirements for a fee award under the Act were met.8 5
Fear that decisions such as Adams will lead to artificial civil
rights actions being joined with non-fee claims is easily dispelled.
The "substantiality" and "common nucleus" requirements, coupled with the equitable power of courts to shift the burden of fees
to the plaintiff if an action has been commenced in bad faith, should
provide adequate safeguards against the fabrication of spurious federal claims. As noted by the Adams court, it would be "manifestly
unfair to penalize plaintiffs who couple their constitutional claims
with meritorious statutory claims and thereby facilitate the federal
policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions."86 Such reasoning effectuates the Act's purpose by protecting the public interest litigant from compromising his rights in order to come within the
purview of the Act.
not "so patently rational as to require no meaningful consideration," 415 U.S. at 541, the
Court was able to find a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
"H. REP., supra note 5, at 4 n.7 (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Assuming the substantiality of a federal claim, see note 81 supra,
the Supreme Court, in United Mine Workers, declared that a state claim may not be heard
in federal court based on pendant jurisdiction unless it is shown to have arisen from the same
actionable wrong as the federal claim. Id. at 725-30; see Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities
Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978).
1 436 F. Supp. at 894 (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974)); see note 81
supra.
" 436 F. Supp. at 894 (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966)).
1 436 F. Supp. at 894. The court noted that the "substantiality" and "common nucleus"
tests, see notes 81-84 and accompanying text supra, were formulated by the Supreme Court
in determining a federal court's authority to adjudicate pendant claims. 436 F. Supp. at 895.
Both cases, however, were cited in the House Report as persuasive analogies to be used in
resolving a fee award issue identical to that before the court in Adams. See H. REP., supra
note 2, at 4 n.7. The Adams court concluded that to interpret Congress' intent in any other
fashion would "require a decision of the fee claim in all instances," thereby "thwart[ingJ
the federal policy discouraging unnecessary constitutional decisions in order to further the
congressional policy of encouraging private actions to enforce the civil rights laws which is
expressed in the Act." 436 F. Supp. at 895.
Approximately 1 week following the Adams decision, the sixth circuit, in Seals v. Quarterly County Ct., 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977), construed the Act in a virtually identical
fashion. In an action seeking reformation of certain county election plans, the district court
had granted the requested relief but had denied their requests for attorney's fees. Id. at 392.
On appeal, the sixth circuit reversed the denial of fees, notwithstanding the fact that the
lower court's final disposition rested on a state law claim rather than the constitutional
argument offered under § 1983. Id. at 394.
" 436 F. Supp. at 895.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:562

The DiscretionaryNature of the Award
Notwithstanding a determination that a party has prevailed in
an action to which the Act is applicable, an award of attorney's fees
is not mandated by the statute. 7 Tracking the language of
Newman,88 the Senate Report states that "[a] party seeking to
enforce the rights protected by the [applicable] statutes if successful 'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.' ",89 Since the Act's
passage, courts have exercised their discretionary power to shift fees
in a wide variety of actions." Generally, these cases involved classic
private attorney general situations in which a party obtained injunctive relief in actions embracing constitutional issues of great
magnitude.9 ' In addition, the positive disposition of these suits typically benefited persons other than the party who initiated the lawsuit. In contrast, when the scope and effect of litigation has been
something less than pervasive, and a large damage award rendered,
courts have had difficulty applying the Act. For example, in
92 the defendant was a county judge in Suffolk
Zarcone v. Perry
County, New York, who, upon tasting a cup of coffee purchased
from Zarcone, expressed "disapproval of its quality."93 The judge
then had Zarcone handcuffed and brought to his chambers to be
severely reprimanded.94 In a suit brought under section 1983, the
plaintiff recovered a judgment of $141,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages.95 The district court, however, refused to award
attorney's fees to the plaintiff under the Act.98 Noting the discretionary nature of the fee award, the court emphasized that the plaintiff's
See note 113 infra.
See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
" S. REP., supra note 5, at 4 (quoting 390 U.S. at 402).
See, e.g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) (unconstitutional conditions
in detention facilities); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977) (housing discrimination);
Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977) (first amendment violations); Brown v.
Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1977) (unconstitutional denial of medical reimbursements);
Fuller v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1977) (unconstitutional mail inspection);
Schmidt v. Schuvert, 433 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (unconstitutional hospital visitation
policies); Peacock v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 433 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Miss. 1977)
(employment discrimination); Commonwealth of Pa. v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (mem.), affl'd, 573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978) (unconstitutional promotional practices).
" See Derfner, supra note 39, at 443 & nn.9-22.
22 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'g on other grounds 438 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
,1438 F. Supp. at 789.
"

SR

I/d.

Id. On a prior appeal, the second circuit refused to overturn the punitive damage
award despite the defendant's claim that it was excessive. Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d
Cir. 1978).
11438 F. Supp. at 792.
"
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claim was "solely for damages."9 Equating the plaintiffs suit to one
in tort for false arrest and imprisonment, the court found that the
public interest was vindicated in only "a general, indirect sense." 8
Although the complaint in this case was phrased in constitutional
terms, the court reasoned that "it is only when plaintiffs advance
the public interest by bringing the action that an award of attorneys' fees is proper.""
While the second circuit affirmed the denial of a fee award, it
specifically rejected the view that to be eligible for attorney's fees
the plaintiff must show a direct benefit resulting to others.'1° Instead, the court considered the applicability of the Newman rule
under the facts presented.10 1 The court reasoned that the defendant's excellent "prospects for a substantial monetary recovery"
eliminated any barrier that counsel fees would present to bringing
a suit for damages since competent legal representation could readily be procured on a contingent basis. 0 2 In contrast, Newman involved a suit for injunctive relief in which the plaintiff could not
receive damages and thus had no assurance that his attorney's fees
would be paid."3 Interpreting the Newman rationale to be based on
the notion that fee awards are necessary when a "financial disincentive or bar to vigorous enforcement of civil rights" exists, the second
circuit determined that a denial of fees to Zarcone would have no
such effect." 4
It is submitted that the Zarcone court misinterpreted the discretionary nature of the fee award under the Newman test and
incorrectly applied factors which were meant to be weighed in determining the size of the award. Significantly, in authorizing fee shift" Id. at 790.
is Id.

0 Id. at 791. The district court found support for its position in the second circuit
decision of Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976). Fortinvolved a housing discrimination
claim brought under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976),
which authorizes a discretionary award of attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff. In shifting
the burden of fees to the defendant, the second circuit stated:
It is a matter of discretion for the trial judge but in the exercise of that discretion the role of counsel acting not only on behalf of his client but others similarly
situated cannot be ignored .... In view of this contribution we feel that the plaintiffs may be recognized as having rendered substantial service to the community
and that on this basis attorney's fees should be awarded.
530 F.2d at 1118-19.
'1 581 F.2d at 1040.
101Id. at 1042-44.

IN0
Id. at 1044.
'"See
'0'

notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.

581 F.2d at 1044.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:562

ing under The Fair Housing Act of 1968,105 Congress provided that
fees may be granted unless the party requesting the award is financially able to assume them. This proviso has been interpreted to
preclude fee recoveries by prevailing plaintiffs who were represented
by counsel on a contingent fee basis."' 6 Had Congress intended that
an ostensibly meritorious damage suit should render an award unnecessary under the 1976 Act, a similar provision could readily have
been added. To the contrary, the House Report which accompanied
the Act states:
Of course, it should be noted that the mere recovery of damages should not preclude the awarding of counsel fees. Under the
antitrust laws, for example, a plaintiff may recover treble damages
and still the court is required to award attorney fees. The same
principle should apply here as civil rights plaintiffs should not be
singled out for different and less favorable treatment. 1°7
The necessity of a two-tiered inquiry whereby a court determines whether a fee award is proper prior to considering the factors
relevant to its size was recognized by a first circuit panel in Sargeant
v. Sharp.0 8 In Sargeant,the district court denied fees to a prevailing
plaintiff who had recovered damages of $88,000 in a section 1983
suit, 10 reasoning that a contingency fee arrangement had guaranteed that the plaintiff's counsel would be adequately compensated. 110 Rejecting this rationale, the court of appeals stated that
"1 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). The fee-shifting provision of the Fair Housing Act is
embodied in § 3612(c).

101
In Samuel v. Benedict, 573 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1978), the prevailing plaintiff sought
attorney's fees under the fee-shifting provision of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §
3612(c) (1976). Noting that this provision allows the court to award fees provided "the said
plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume said attorney's fees,"
the court refused to allow the award since a plaintiff who enteres into a contingency fee
arrangement is "financially able to assume attorney's fees." 573 F.2d at 582.
"' H. REP., supra note 5, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted). Consistent with the language in the
House Report, a federal district court, in Furtado v. Bishop, 453 F. Supp. 606 (D. Mass. 1978),
granted fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff who previously had been awarded a judgment
of $27,500 after being beaten by several state prison officials. Id. at 607. The award was
premised on the court's recognition of Congress' intent that the "plaintiff's recovery should
not be reduced by having to pay counsel." Id. Similarly, a number of other courts have
unhesitatingly assessed fees under the Act despite damage awards to plaintiffs who, at the
outset of the litigation, were possessed of apparently good "prospects for a substantial monetary recovery." See, e.g., Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. Gladney,
451 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Ellis v. Zieger, 449 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Fagot
v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978).
lOS 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 646. The suit was based on the defendants' failure to compensate the plaintiffs,
pursuant to an administrative order, for assistance rendered over a 6-year period by various
registered nurses. Id.
11 Id. The trial judge stated that a fee award is primarily meant "'to cover the ser-
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entitlement to fees is an issue to which the Newman "special circumstances" test should apply, and to which the existence of a
private fee arrangement is irrelevant."' In recognizing entitlement
as a question antecedent to and separate from all others, it appears
that the Sargeant court has properly interpreted the Act. Implicity
in the court's approach is the view that strong prospects of a damage
recovery should neither render the Newman rule inapplicable nor
qualify as a "special circumstance" under it."'

Notwithstanding the liberal language used in the House and
Senate Reports, it is clear that Congress envisioned certain cases in
which the prevailing party should be denied an award of fees. Were
its intent otherwise, the statute could have provided that a prevailing party "will" be awarded attorney's fees." 3 Congress, in delineating the breadth of the Act, noted that "[i]t is limited to cases
arising under our civil rights laws, a category of cases in which
attorney's fees have been traditionally regarded as appropriate.""'
vices of counsel who undertake to bring such cases as public service for individuals or classes
of individuals who are unable to pay.' "Id.
m Id. at 648.
Id. In contrast to the Sarged t approach, the Zarcone court stated that when a plaintiff's prospects for a damage recovery "are sufficiently bright. . . , the underlying rationale
of the Newman-Northcross rule may be inapplicable." 581 F.2d at 1044. It appears that in
resolving the initial question of entitlement the second circuit has considered factors which
are only to be weighed in determining the proper size of the award to be granted. In discussing
the criteria to to be used in determining a reasonable fee award, both the House and Senate
Report approved the method of fee calculation employed by the fifth circuit in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); see S. REP., supra note 5, at 6;
H. REP., supra note 5, at 8. The Johnson court stated that although a court "should consider
the amount of damages [recovered by the party requesting attorney's fees],. . . that consideration should not obviate court scrutiny of the decision's effect on the law. If the decision
corrects across-the-board discrimination affecting a large class of [people], the attorney's fee
award should reflect the relief granted." 488 F.2d at 718. In Johnson,a plaintiff who had been
awarded attorney's fees as the prevailing party in a suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964
challenged the adequacy of the fees. The court enumerated 12 factors to be used in calculating
the proper size of the award. See note 164 and accompanying text infra. This calculation was
appropriate only after it had been determined that an award was justified under the Newman
standard. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra. In contrast, the Zarcone court
tracked the Johnson language and criteria but stated that these factors must be weighed "in
determining whether to award fees." 581 F.2d at 1044.
"I Certain bills were introduced which would have required the courts to shift fees in
favor of prevailing plaintiffs. See 122 CoNG. REc. H12,165 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). These bills
were, however, defeated in deference to the Act's present standards of award, which illustrate
"a more moderate approach." H. REP., supra note 5, at 8; see id. n.5 and accompanying text.
See also Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 557-58 & n.36 (8th Cir. 1977).
"I S. RE., supra note 5, at 4 (emphasis added). With respect to traditional definitions,
it is difficult to classify Zarcone as a public interest litigant in the first instance. The conceputalization and classification of plaintiff Zarcone is an important factor since the Supreme
Court, in Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974), identified the nature and identity of
the parties as one of three crucial factors to be considered in determining whether a fee award
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Examination of previous fee awards fails to reveal precedent for fee
shifting in cases which are essentially tort actions whose factual
bases are not likely to generate recurrent civil rights violations. "'
Thus, it is not untenable to conclude that Congress considers it a
"special circumstance" to force states to absorb the costs of lawsuits
which are not likely to benefit other aggrieved persons by affecting
changes in the law, or by altering governmental or judicial policy.
The district court opinion in Zarcone, which emphasized the tortious nature of the plaintiffs claim and the fact that the public
interest had been advanced in only a general sense,"1 ' appears to
117
have taken a proper analytical approach.
Naprstek v. City of Norwich"' presented another situation
where an award of fees could be considered unjust. After having
successfully attacked the constitutionality of the defendant's juvenile curfew odinances under section 1983,111 the plaintiff sought attorney's fees. The court, emphasizing that the challenged statute
was "antiquated" and "rarely enforced," stated that the plaintiff's
claim was "more contrived than real."' 20 Further, since the defenwould work an injustice. Id. at 717. As the rationale underlying many statutory fee award
provisions is that the litigant's suit will benefit the general public, fee awards become less
proper as the nature of the parties and the action become more private.
"I The Zarcone district court stated that "in every action brought under Title VII...
where damages have been awarded and attorneys' fees granted, the interest of the public or
an identifiable class has been benefitted." 438 F. Supp. at 791 (footnotes omitted); see id. at
795-96 (appendix of Title VII cases). Many courts have awarded fees under the Act in a
factual setting which arguably gives rise to a tort action but is framed in terms of a constitutional claim. For example, in Phillips v. Moore, 411 F. Supp. 833 (W.D.N.C. 1977), the
plaintiff prevailed in a suit brought under § 1983. The suit had been instituted after the
plaintiff had been struck by the sheriff while in the general custody of the County Sheriff's
department. Phillips,however, appears distinguishable from Zarcone. In the former case, the
cause of action arose from conduct of the defendant which emanated from the performance
of his official duties. Hence, plaintiff's suit may be viewed as having been brought against
an entire branch of the government, resulting in a vindication of prisoners' rights on a
pervasive level. Zarcone lacks these characteristics, however, since the cause of action arose
from one man's peculiarities exercised in an ex officio manner. As noted, the public or private
nature of the parties and the action are relevant considerations to a court exercising its
discretionary powers of fee shifting under the Act. See note 114 supra.
,,6
See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
,, In an earlier second circuit decision where fees were granted pursuant to the Act, the
court cited the district court opinion in Zarcone with approval, noting that "[tihe plaintiffs
were not seeking to gain any narrow personal objective" by instituting their civil rights suit.
Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978).
"' 433 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
"' Id. at 1369. The ordinance in question forbade children under 17 years of age from
being on the streets or in the public places and buildings of Norwich after 11:00 p.m. on
Sunday through Thursday, and midnight on Friday and Saturday. Id.
"I Id. at 1370. Although the district court had originally abstained from deciding the
constitutional issues pending state court construction of the ordinance, the second circuit
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dant offered to redraft the ordinance to correct the alleged deficiencies and the city council subsequently nullified the curfew, the court
found that an award would be unjust. 2 ' In holding as it did, the
court underscored its belief that attorneys and litigants should not
be rewarded for burdening the courts with unnecessary litigation.

22

Given the discretionary nature of the fee award under the
Newman standard, it behooves courts to examine initially the basis
of the underlying litigation and the effect that its adjudication may
have on the free exercise of civil rights by the public at large. While
a litigant's action should not have to benefit other persons directly
in order to merit a fee award, the lawsuit should redress wrongs in
a manner which could be deemed "therapeutic."
Fee Awards to PrevailingDefendants
Another interesting aspect of the Act is that it provides for
discretionary fee shifting in favor of the defendant. In an exceptional case a prevailing defendant will be considered a private attorney general and will be eligible to recover fees under the Newman
rule. 23 In the normal situation, however, it would appear that Conheld that the absence of a termination date in the ordinance rendered it unconstitutionally
vague. Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
2 433 F. Supp. at 1370-71.

122 Id.

at 1371. The court was undoubtedly correct in concluding that the plaintiff's suit
was unwarranted since it appeared that he refused to meet with Norwich city officials who
were ready to reconcile all differences by redrafting those portions of the ordinance which
constituted the foundation for the suit. Id.
Despite the apparent propriety of the court's result, certain problems nonetheless inhere
in the language and approach of Naprstek. It was noted that the plaintiff's claim did not "rise
to the level of national priority or constitutional dimension which warranted the award of fees
in Newman." Id. at 1370. From this, the court seemed to conclude that the plaintiff's suit
was not within the general thrust of the Act, and thus, the Newman test should not even be
reached with respect to the question of entitlement. Id. It is submitted that a more proper
approach is simply to apply the Newman guidelines to every victorious party in the first
instance. See notes 108-112 and accompanying text supra. To do otherwise would establish
an arbitrary test. It would vest too broad a discretionary power to preclude fee awards for
litigants whose claims are meritorious but which do not, in the judge's view, present issues
of sufficient constitutional magnitude. Applying the Newman test in the first instance would
afford a more liberal approach to the determination of entitlement consistent with the intent
of Congress. This process would in essence place on the defendant the burden of disproving
entitlement by showing "special circumstances" rather than forcing the plaintiff to further
establish that his action has vindicated rights of the public-at-large.
123See S. REP., supra note 5, at 4 n.4. The Senate Report cited Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), as an example of a situation where fee awards to defendants should be granted
under the Newman rule. S. REP., supra note 5, at 4 n.4. The Shelley plaintiff had sought to
enforce a constitutionally violative restrictive covenant which excluded persons of particular
races from owning or occupying real property. 334 U.S. at 4-5. In situations like this, it is the
defendant who has assumed the role of the public interest litigant.
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gress intended a defendant to receive a fee award only under the
traditional bad faith doctrine. In this vein, the Senate Report prescribes that defendants should recover attorney's fees only in those
instances where the action is "clearly frivolous, vexatious, or
brought for harassment purposes.' 24 Limiting defendant fee
awards to the traditional equitable exception to the general no-fee
rule reflects an effort by Congress to minimize the hazards of litigation often encountered by public interest litigants.' 25 Unlike the
private attorney general whose claims the Act was meant to promote, defendants do not ordinarily "appear before the court cloaked
'2
in a mantle of public interest.' 1
A more liberal approach to awarding fees to prevailing defendants is evident in Goff v.Texas Instruments, Inc., ' 27wherein the
plaintiff claimed that he had been discharged by the defendant on
the basis of religion and national origin.'1 After a hearing at which
Goff conceded that he had not stated a claim under the federal civil
rights statutes, the suit was dismissed.' 29 The court noted that Goff
refused to abandon the case voluntarily and found that "[t]he
discovery conducted in the case indicated not an iota of evidence to
support [his] claim." 3 ' In granting the defendant's request for attorney's fees, the court stated that "prevailing defendants may recover under less egregious circumstances than traditional bad faith,
harassment, or an absolute refusal to cooperate in the litigation." 1 3' '
As the Act refers to "prevailing parties" rather than prevailing
plaintiffs, the Goff court reasoned that if the traditional bad faith
standard were used in awarding fees to defendants, "the statute
' 32
would be logically redundant and unnecessary.'
121S. REP.,

supra note 5, at 5 (citing United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 385 F.

Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975)).
"I Public interest litigants were often hesitant to commence expensive, protracted litigation. This resulted from the realization that plaintiffs who often prevailed in these actions

were denied fees under the traditional exceptions to the American no-fee rule. See notes 3738 and accompanying text supra. Since the Act was designed to alleviate this problem,
Congress sought to maintain a strict standard for defendant fee awards in order to avoid
deterring the commencement of civil rights suits because of the "prospect of having [public
interest litigants] pay their opponent's counsel fees should they lose." S. REp., supra note 5,
at 5.
126 H. REP., supra note 5, at 6 (quoting United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519
F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975)).
"2 429 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (mem.).
i2 Plaintiff Goff, an engineer, alleged that he had been laid off by the defendant because
of his Jewish-American background. Id. at 974.
MnId. Goff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985 (1976). 429 F. Supp. at 974 n.1.
1"'
429 F. Supp. at 976.
"I Id. at 975.
632 Id. The court, quoting the Senate Report guidelines respecting defendant fee
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Virtually identical reasoning was used in ChristiansburgGarment Co. v. EEOC,1 3 where the Supreme Court articulated the
circumstances under which a prevailing defendant may be granted
fees under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'13 Rejecting the contention
that fees to prevailing defendants may be awarded only when the
lawsuit is "brought in subjective bad faith," the Court stated that
the plaintiffs action must be "frivolous, unreasonable or without
foundation. 13 5 Crucial to the Court's holding was the 1964 Act's
authorization of fee shifting in favor of a "prevailing party" rather
awards, see note 140 infra, focused on the report's statement that fees could be assessed
against a public interest litigant "only where it is shown that his suit was clearly frivolous,
vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes." 429 F. Supp. at 975 (quoting S. REP., supra
note 5, at 5 (citing United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975))).
The Goff court then distinguished this standard from the traditional rule which requires
that one has litigated "'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.'
429 F. Supp. at 975 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975)). Although it was conceded that there appears to be "substantial overlap in these
standards," 429 F. Supp. at 975, the court attempted to distinguish them. Of particular note
was the court's reliance on the defendant fee award standards enunciated in various Title VII
cases, all of which highlighted the plaintiffs' "unreasonableness" in bringing "meritless or
frivolous" suits. See id. at 975-76 (quoting Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.
1976); Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 389 F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1975); Paddison v. Fidelity
Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1973)). These standards were deemed to allow the assessment
of fees against a plaintiff who had, in good faith, instituted or maintained a meritless suit.
In this regard, it appears that the Goff court overlooked much language in the House and
Senate Reports which strongly indicates a congressional adoption of the traditional bad faith
standard, and which also illustrates a different interpretation of certain Title VII cases relied
on by the court. See notes 139-140 and accompanying text infra.
22

98 S. Ct. 694 (1978).

In Christiansburg, the EEOC brought a Title VII suit against the Christiansburg
Garment Co., alleging violations of the unlawful employment practice provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 696; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). The EEOC sued in its own
name pursuant to the 1972 amendments which authorize this procedure if the underlying
charges were pending on the effective date of the amendments. 98 S.Ct. at 696. The district
court granted summary judgment after finding that the complainant's charges were not
pending with the EEOC at the time the action was commenced. 376 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.
Va. 1974). Attorney's fees were denied by the trial court, however, upon a finding that "'the
Commission's action in bringing the suit cannot be characterized as unreasonable or meritless."' 98 S.Ct. at 697. A divided fourth circuit panel affirmed the denial of fees on the basis
of the EEOC's "good faith" in pursuing the litigation. 550 F.2d 949, 951 (4th Cir. 1977).
"1 98 S.Ct. at 700. In holding that subjective bad faith is not necessary to justify a
defendant fee award, the Court approved the standards previously set by two circuit courts
of appeals in United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975), and
Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976). The Court's adoption of the standards
employed in these cases was prompted in great part by their authorization of defendant fee
awards in "unreasonable," "meritless," and "frivolous" lawsuits. See 98 S.Ct. at 700. Although the approaches of both Carrion and United States Steel were also approved in the
reports accompanying the 1976 Act, it appears that Congress viewed these cases as requiring
a defendant to show subjective bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. See notes 139-140 and
=ccompanying text infra.
''
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than a prevailing plaintiff.' 31 It was reasoned that if fees were meant
to be awarded to defendants under the more exacting traditional
bad faith standard, then the statute would in part be redundant
3
since "no [fee-shifting] provision would have been necessary.'
It is submitted that however applicable considerations of redundancy may be to interpreting congressional intent in making fee
awards available to "prevailing parties" under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the reports accompanying the 1976 Act evince a
clear intent that bad faith be measured by the traditional subjective
standard. As the Supreme Court noted, the legislative history of the
Title VII fee shifting provision provides only the "barest outlines"
respecting the proper defendant fee award standard.' 38 In contrast,
the numerous references to "bad faith" in the legislative history of
the 1976 Act provide compelling support for adoption of a subjective
standard. Specifically, the House Report states that "[i]f the
plaintiff is 'motivated by malice and vindictiveness' . . . the court
may award counsel fees to the prevailing defendant."'' 3 9 Similarly,
the Senate Report adopts the position that fees should not be assessed against a party whose claim, if it was brought in good faith,
is found to be meritless.'4 0 This standard was deemed sufficient to
,' 98 S. Ct. at 699 & n.13.
,3 Id. at 699.
13X

Id.

"' H. REP., supra note 5, at 7 (quoting Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.
1976)). In contrast to the House Report's apparent adoption of Carrion as a case requiring a
showing of subjective bad faith, both Christiansburgand Goff cited Carrionin support of the
position that Title VII defendant fee awards could be premised on the institution of a meritless or groundless action. See notes 132 & 135 supra.
"I S. REP., supra note 5, at 5 (citing Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp.
519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972)). In Richardson, the plaintiff was
discharged by the defendant employer after it was learned that the plaintiff previously had
been convicted of theft and receipt of stolen goods. 332 F. Supp. at 520. In his Title VII action,
the plaintiff claimed that racial discrimination inhered in the employer's policy of discharging
persons with criminal records since more black persons than white have been convicted of
serious crimes. Id. After prevailing on the merits, the defendant sought attorney's fees. This
request was denied on the ground that "the plaintiff proceeded in good faith on the advice of
competent counsel." Id. at 522.
Following its reference to Richardson, the Senate Report cited United States Steel Corp.
v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1974), affl'd, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975). This
case was referred to in Christiansburgas one which authorized defendant fee awards in Title
VII cases upon a showing that the plaintiff's suit was meritless or unfounded. See note 135
supra. The Senate Report, however, cited United States Steel and then stated that the 1976
Act "thus deters frivolous suits by authorizing an award of attorneys' fees against a party
shown to have litigated in 'bad faith.'" S. REP., supra note 5, at 5.
The uncertainties that Christiansburgmay foster in determining the propriety of defendant fee awards under the 1976 Act are apparent in Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.
1978). In Hughes, suit was commenced under §§ 1982 and 1985, alleging racial discrimination
and conspiracy on the part of Mr. and Mrs. John Repko in refusing to rent an apartment to
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prevent the Act from being "used for clearly unwarranted harassment purposes."' 4 ' Posed against this concrete language, the more
abstruse redundancy arguments advanced in Christiansburg and
Goff must yield to the conclusion that Congress, in authorizing defendant fee awards under the 1976 Act, meant only to codify the
equitable power previously held by the courts.4 2 Application of a
standard more lenient than "bad faith" in granting fee awards to
defendants would result in increased hesitance to vindicate civil
rights in a manner similar to that which crippled public interest
litigation before passage of the Act. In Goff it was properly noted
that "a court should not assess penalties against a plaintiff for proceeding on a novel. . . theory.'1 3 Nonetheless, the court's holding
would appear to increase the probability that a litigant with a
"novel theory" would be unwilling to speculate that his action
would not result in fee shifting to the defendant by a court applying
standards any less exacting than those of the bad faith doctrine.
TAX Surrs AND FEE SHIFTING UNDER THE AcT

Apart from awards to prevailing civil rights litigants, the Act
authorizes the shifting of fees in favor of prevailing parties, other
than the United States, "in any civil action or proceeding, by or on
behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a
violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue
Code.""' Incorporated into the Act through a Senate amendment to
the original bill, "' discussion of the intended purpose and effect of
this provision is absent from both the House and Senate Reports.
After introducing this amendment, Senator Allen described its
scope by stating that if "the Government does not prevail against
the taxpayer, then the court, in its discretion, just as in the other
the black plaintiffs. Id. at 485. The plaintiffs prevailed on the § 1982 claim against Mrs.
Repko. Id. Thereafter, Mr. Repko, who had prevailed on both claims against him, sought an
award of attorney's fees under the Act. Id. While the court first referred to the standards
enunciated in Christiansburg,the award was denied on the basis of the district court's finding
that the "plaintiffs proceeded in good faith on the advice of counsel," and did not intend to
"harass, embarass, or abuse" the defendant. Id. at 489.
24 H. REP., supra note 5, at 7; see S. REP., supra note 5, at 5.
242 Further detracting from the redundancy argument espoused in Goff, see notes 127132 and accompanying text supra, is the court's failure to recognize that use of the term
"prevailing party" was necessary to bring within the scope of the Act those defendants who,
in the procedural posture of some cases, may be the public interest litigants. See note 123
supra.
"'

429 F. Supp. at 976.

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
,,See 122 CONG. REc. S17,049-53 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976).
24
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cases, would be entitled to award the taxpayer attorney's fees."' 46
Thereafter, the sponsor of the Act, Senator Tunney, in An effort "to
make clear [his] understanding of the intent of this amendment,"
stated that its purpose was "to discourage frivolous or harrassing
lawsuits.' 14 7 Moreover, subsequent to the Act's passage, it was noted
that the amendment was meant to apply only to those cases where
the taxpayer could "show bad faith on the part of the government."' 48
At first glance, it might appear that a traditional "bad faith"
standard under this amendment would merely grant statutory authority to the courts which they already exercised in their equitable
capacities. By statute, however, the recovery of attorney's fees from
the United States is exclusively forbidden absent congressional authority. 49' In light of this requirement, it becomes evident that the
Act provides the taxpayer with a previously unavailable remedy.
Thus, any argument of redundancy concerning the inclusion of the
bad faith standard in the tax amendment is groundless. Furthermore, it does not seem sound to conclude that Senator Allen was
referring to the Newman rule when he stated that the taxpayer
should recover fees "just as in other cases."' 5 Although Congress
intended the public interest litigant to "ordinarily recover an attorney's fee," such a result in tax cases would effectively penalize the
United States for attempting in good faith to enforce its own laws.' 5 '
Clearly, if this were Congress' desired result in passing the Act, far
more explicit language would have been employed.
Assuming bad faith on the part of the United States, a court
faced with a fee request by a prevailing taxpayer must determine
whether there has in fact been an "action or proceeding, by or on
behalf of the United States." This issue is of particular relevance
in a tax refund suit. Senator Allen's intention that his amendment
encompass all tax controversies involving disputed liability is clear
from a statement he made after the Act became law:
,,6
Id. at S17,049 (remarks of Sen. Allen) (emphasis added).
',, Id. at S17,050 (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
Id. (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
", 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976) explicitly forbids the assessment of attorney's fees against the
United States government unless otherwise provided for by statute. See Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 267-69 (1975). For an example of the specific
authorization required by § 2412, see Title Il of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000a-3(b) (1976).
15 See note 146 and accompanying text supra.
In clarifying the intended scope of the amendment awarding fees to prevailing parties
in tax proceedings, Senator Tunney related his view that "[tlhe purpose of this amendment
is not to discourage meritorious lawsuits by the IRS." 122 CONG. Rec. S17,050 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1976).
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I inserted the word "proceeding" in my new amendment specifically to include administrative proceedings or audits so that fees
and costs in connection with audits or other IRS agency proceedings could be awarded by a court on application of a prevailing
taxpayer.
The idea simply is that in any proceeding in which the Government asserts a taxpayer's liability for a tax and the taxpayer
asserts that he is not liable for the tax and thereafter prevails, then.
a court may award fees to the taxpayer as the court sees fit. The
form which the action takes is not of consequence.
. ..The reasons of public policy which would make proper a
discretionary award of fees are thus present or not present in a
given tax controversy regardless of the formal position of the parties.'52

Since these statements were made after passage of the Act, the
Court of Claims, in Aparacor, Inc. v. United States,'53 concluded
that they represent "little more than an expression of Senator
Allen's personal opinion and are of slight value in construing the
intent and meaning of the statute."'54 Focusing on numerous comments made by legislators during the House and Senate debates, all
of which spoke of the amendment in terms of defendant taxpayers
and suits initiated by the government, 5 the Aparacor court held
that the Act does not authorize fee awards in a suit where the
1 56
taxpayer is the plaintiff.
W' 123 CONG. Rlc. S732 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1977); see Aparacor, Inc. v. United States,
571 F.2d 552, 556-57 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
M=571 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
154
Id. at 556 (citing In re Kline, 429 F. Supp. 1025, 1026-27 (D. Md. 1977); Lieb v. United
States, [1977] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 9752 (E.D. Okla. 1977); Key Buick Co. v.
Commissioner, 68 T.C. 178, 183 (1977); cf.United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 348-49 (1963) ("views of members of subsequent legislatures upon intent of prior legislatures in passing statute entitled to little weight"); Fogarty v. United States, 340 U.S. 8, 1314 (1950)).
"I See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc. 817,050 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Tunney)
("amendment would not apply to a situation where the Government is plaintiff on appeal
since the Government did not bring the action in the first instance"); id. (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy) ("a court would be authorized to award attorney's fees to a taxpayer who is a
defendant in a civil action brought by the U.S. Government"; "awards are appropriate where
the action initiated by the plaintiff, the Government, acted in a frivolous or vexatious manner").
"1'571 F.2d at 558. Despite the clear support that the Aparacorholding derives from the
Act's legislative record, one federal district court, without reference to the statute or its
legislative history, held that "the status of a party as a plaintiff or as a defendant is not
relevant with respect to the award of attorney fees" under the Act. Levno v. United States,
440 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D. Mont. 1977). Leuno was a simple refund suit arising from the IRS'
disallowance of the plaintiff's deferred contracts for the sale of cattle. Without examining the
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Whether the amendment authorizes fee awards to plaintiffs
who have successfully defended against vexatious or harassing governmental counterclaims, a question left open in Aparacor,51 7 is also
unclear. In Patzkowski v. United States,5 ' the eighth circuit rejected the contention that, notwithstanding a counterclaim by the
government, no part of the action could be "by or on behalf of" the
United States 59 since the plaintiff had commenced a tax refund
suit:
language of the Allen amendment, but apparently attempting to bring the case within the
language and purview of the Act, the court stated that "[tihis civil action was instituted as
a result of a proceeding on behalf of the United States of America to enforce a provision of
the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
The Levno court is singular in its opinion that the Allen amendment authorizes a fee
award to a taxpayer in a simple refund suit. Other courts have held the Act inapplicable to
these situations. E.g., Haskins v. United States, [1978] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 9197
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1977); Lieb v. United States, [1977] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 9752
(E.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 1977); Schulken Bros. Paper Stock Co. v. United States, [19771 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 9712 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1977); In re Kline, 429 F. Supp. 1025 (D.
Md. 1977); Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 36 (Dec. 15, 1977).
Unquestionably, the narrow interpretation given the Allen amendment by the majority
of courts falls short of providing an effective safeguard against abusive IRS tactics. The
Internal Revenue laws are framed so that a taxpayer denying a liability is the technical
plaintiff in any refund suit. See Note, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees in Tax Litigation: 42
U.S.C. § 1988, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1368, 1370-71 & nn.14-20 (1978). One commentator, arguing
in favor of the Levno result, states that a "more reasonable approach is that which accords
meaning and content to congressional statutes." Id. at 1380. Similarly, two judges concurring
in the Aparacor decision recognized that the Allen amendment, narrowly construed,
"accomplishes an insignificant result." 571 F.2d at 558. They refused to construe the statute
more broadly, however, reasoning that to do so would constitute improper judicial legislation.
Id. at 559. It was thus concluded that until Congress clarified the amendment, it must remain
"more an expression of disgruntlement with the tactics of some revenue agents than . . . an
effective piece of legislation." Id. Identical sentiments were voiced by a district court in
Richman v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ill. 1978). Plaintiff Richman, after having
been harassed by the Internal Revenue Service, instituted and won a tax refund suit against
the government. Despite its awareness that the vast majority of actions stemming from
oppressive IRS tactics force the taxpayer to assume the role of the plaintiff-initiator, the
court, bound by the procedural restraints of the Allen amendment's language, see notes 152154 and accompanying text supra, denied the plaintiffs request for attorney's fees:
In the instant case, we would be happy to award plaintiff attorney's fees if there
were any basis for so doing. He deserves at least to be made whole for his out-ofpocket expenditures and the government deserves to be penalized for the conduct
of its agents. If attorney's fees could be awarded, it might deter IRS personnel from
similar conduct in the future. Unfortunately, there is no way for us to do so even
though we agree with plaintiffs counsel that the statutory language compels an
illogical, even ridiculous, result. The correction, however, rests with Congress, not
the courts.
447 F. Supp. at 934.
'7 571 F.2d at 558.
576 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1978).
t59 Id. at 136.
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It is beyond all doubt or cavil that this counterclaim was filed by
or on behalf of the Government; it was most assuredly not filed on
behalf of the taxpayer. The fact that the taxpayer had originally
filed a refund suit did not change the reality of the ensuing proceeding, in which he was required to defend against a governmen1
tal counterclaim. 60
The Patzkowski decision appears to reach a proper result considering the purpose of the Allen amendment. As an alternative to
asserting its collection action as a counterclaim in the taxpayer
refund suit, the government could have filed an independent collection action.' Notwithstanding the fact that the debates surrounding the amendment are replete with references to defendant taxpayers,6 2 it would not appear reasonable to conclude that in adopting
this section of the Act, Congress meant to hinge a taxpayer's fortune
on the legal nature and posture of the collection process selected by
the government.
Determining the "Reasonable"Award
Notwithstanding a court's determination that a fee award
under the Act is justified, a public interest litigant must show that
the amount requested is reasonable. Congress expressly referred to
certain cases which were deemed to exemplify the proper standards
to be applied. Specifically, both the House and Senate Reports cited
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 63 with approval.
Johnson enumerated the relevant criteria in arriving at a reasonable
fee award as follows: 1) "The time and labor required"; 2) "The
novelty and difficulty of the questions"; 3) "The skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly"; 4) "The preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case"; 5) "The
customary fee"; 6) "Whether the fee is fixed or contingent"; 7)
"Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances"; 8)
"The amount involved and the results obtained"; 9) "The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys"; 10) "The
'~

Id. (footnote omitted).

Id. n.1 (citing Caleshu v. United States, 570 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978)); Pfeiffer Co. v.
United States, 518 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1975); see Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
18 See note 155 and accompanying text supra.
" 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). In the district court, the plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees as "prevailing parties" in a class action suit alleging discharge from employment
because of their race or color. The award was made pursuant to the fee-shifting provision
embodied in § 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1976). On appeal, the fifth circuit vacated the lower court's decision and remanded for
reconsideration of the claim for attorney's fees in light of the guidelines for calculation espoused by the court. 488 F.2d at 714; see note 164 and accompanying text infra.
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'undesirability' of the case"; 11) "The nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client"; and 12) "Awards in similar cases."'6 4
In discussing the factors bearing on the determination of a reasonable award, Congress made clear that the mere recovery of damages should not automatically result in a reduction of the prevailing
party's fee award,6 5 and that fees should not be denied solely because the recipient is under no legal obligation to pay his counsel. 6"
These general guidelines reflect an understanding that the effectiveness of our Civil Rights statutes depends in large part on the
ability of litigants to be adequately compensated for the great ex7
pense incurred in vindicating rights of vast importance.
CONCLUSION

Clear standards governing awards under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 need to be developed and utilized by
the federal courts. In order to facilitate the court's exercise of its feeshifting powers, a two-tiered inquiry is suggested with respect to
determining entitlement under the Act. If, through settlement or
final decree, a party has received even the most technical or inconsequential relief under an enumerated statute or a "common nucleus"
,

488 F.2d at 717-19.
H. REP., supra note 5, at 8-9. The notion that fee and damage recoveries are not
mutually exclusive is inherent in various statutes which require the courts to award both
damages and attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §
15 (1976); Antitrust Parens Patriae Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4c(a)(2) (1976) ("court shall award...
threefold the total damage. . . , and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee");
see notes 87-117 and accompanying text supra.
See H. RE., supra note 5, at 8 n.16. In Schmidt v. Schubert, 433 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D.
Wis. 1977), the plaintiffs, patients at a state hospital, prevailed in a suit brought under §
1983 which challenged the constitutionality of the hospital's visitation policies. The defendant claimed that an award of attorney's fees under the Act would constitute "unjust special
circumstances" since the plaintiffs were under no legal obligation to pay their attorney a fee.
433 F. Supp. at 1118. The court, however, rejected this argument. Similarly, in Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974), a ninth circuit panel reasoned that although the possible denial of fees may not discourage a litigant who is under no legal obligation to pay counsel, this prospect does operate to dissuade attorneys from accepting such
suits. Id. at 889; accord, White v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Howard v. Phelps,
443 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. La. 1978); Alsager v. District Ct., 447 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Iowa 1977);
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 420 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa.), affl'd, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1976). The
failure of courts to award fees to gratuitous counsel would greatly diminish the desirability
of public interest litigation in the legal community, thereby defeating the central purpose of
the legislation.
"' Public interest litigation often involves a great expenditure of money and labor. For
example, in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 416 (D. Colo. 1977), the court
granted an award of $360,100 as reasonable attorney's fees under the Act. Similarly, in
Commonwealth of Pa. v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (mem.), affl'd, 573 F.2d
1301 (3d Cir. 1978), the plaintiffs received a fee award of $200,000 pursuant to the Act.
'"
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non-fee claim, he should initially be brought within the literal words
of the Act. At this juncture, the Newman test should operate to deny
fees only to litigants whose suits either seek relief which would have
no therapeutic value to the public at large or were unnecessarily
brought. In no event, however, should the Newman standard be
applied to preclude fee recoveries by a litigant because he received
damages in his action. Since the Act was meant to encourage vindication of rights evincing extremely high congressional priority, it
seems reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to establish a
standard for fee awards which would leave an aggrieved party fully
compensated for his injury after counsel had been paid.
In examining the proper standard for defendant fee awards, it
should be noted that Congress did not direct its concern towards the
adversary of the public interest litigant. Were defendants awarded
fees under a more liberal standard than traditional bad faith, the
remedial purpose of the act could be thwarted. Although the intent
of the provision allowing fee awards to prevailing parties other than
the United States in tax suits is unclear, it appears that fee awards
should be made only when the government institutes a collection
action or counterclaims in bad faith. Further expansion of the scope
of this section so as to permit awards in other circumstnces should
await specific legislative approval. Finally, courts should be flexible
in arriving at a fee amount which is calculated to effectuate the
purpose of the Act. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 is a commendable effort by Congress to promote private enforcement of our civil rights laws. It is hoped that the courts in
interpreting its provisions will do justice to the spirit of the Act.
ChristopherE. Manno

